Siddhasena Divākara
Nyāyāvatāra

# NYĀYĀVATĀRA:

## The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic

BY

SIDDHA SENA DIVĀKARA

*(The Celebrated Kṣapaṇaka of Vikramāditya's Court)*

**WITH SANSKRIT TEXT AND COMMENTARY**

EDITED FOR THE FIRST TIME

WITH NOTES AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA SATIS CHANDRA VIDYĀBHUSANA,
M.A., PH.D., F.I.R.S.

*Professor of Sanskrit and Pali, Presidency College, Calcutta;
Jt. Philological Secretary, Asiatic Society of Bengal;
and Fellow of the Calcutta University.*

CALCUTTA:

PUBLISHED BY THE INDIAN RESEARCH SOCIETY, 32, CREEK ROW,
AND PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS,
41, LOWER CIRCULAR ROAD.

1909.

# NYĀYĀVATĀRA:

## The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic

BY

SIDDHA SENA DIVĀKARA

*(The Celebrated Kṣapaṇaka of Vikramāditya's Court)*

**WITH SANSKRIT TEXT AND COMMENTARY**

EDITED FOR THE FIRST TIME

WITH NOTES AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA SATIS CHANDRA VIDYĀBHUSANA,
M.A., PH.D., F.I.R.S.

*Professor of Sanskrit and Pali, Presidency College, Calcutta;*
*Jt. Philological Secretary, Asiatic Society of Bengal;*
*and Fellow of the Calcutta University.*

CALCUTTA:

PUBLISHED BY THE INDIAN RESEARCH SOCIETY, 32, CREEK ROW,
AND PRINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS,
41, LOWER CIRCULAR ROAD.

1909.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

# PREFACE.

Professor Peterson, in his Fifth Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Circle, mentions a Jaina Sanskrit work called Nyāyāvatāra by Siddha Sena Divākara. A manuscript of this work, together with a commentary on it called Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti, was kindly procured for me from a private library in Bhavanagara, Bombay, by the well-known S'vetāmbara Sādhus, Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya.

Seeing that the Nyāyāvatāra is a very important work, being the earliest known Jaina treatise on Pure Logic, I have, in the present volume, attached the text of it with extracts from its verbose commentary. I have also included in the volume an English translation which I prepared for the "Journal" of the Indian Research Society of Calcutta. The notes which I have added to elucidate the translation are based on the commentary already referred to.

I acknowledge with thanks that Mr. C. Russell, M.A., Principal, Patna College, has kindly helped me with a number of suggestions while the translation was passing through the press.

My thanks are also due to Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., at whose instance I undertook this work, and who, at the suggestion of the Government of Bengal, forwarded its advance proof to the International Congress of Orientalists held at Copenhagen in August 1908. It was kindly accepted by that learned body as a contribution on the Jaina philosophical literature.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

PRESIDENCY COLLEGE,
CALCUTTA.
*February*, 1909.

# INTRODUCTION.

Siddha Sena Divākara, the author of Nyāyāvatāra.

Logic was mixed up with metaphysics and religion in the ancient writings of the Jainas as in those of other sects in India. The first Jaina writer on Pure Logic appears to have been Siddha Sena Divākara. It was he who, for the first time among the Jainas, distinguished logic from the cognate branches of learning by composing a metrical work called **Nyāyāvatāra** on Logic in thirty-two couplets (ślokas).

Siddha Sena Divākara is the famous author of the **Sammati-tarka-sūtra**, which is a Prākṛta work on philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author who belonged to the S'vetāmbara (white robed) sect has been mentioned by Pradyumna Sūri (980 A.D.) in his Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa.[1]

He was a pupil of Vṛddha-vādi Sūri, and received the name of Kumuda-candra[2] at the time of his ordination. He is said to have split, by the efficacy of his prayers, the *Linga* (Brāhmanical symbol) of Rudra in the temple of Mahākāla at Ujjainī, and to have called forth an image of Pārśvanātha by reciting the hymn Kalyāṇa-mandira-stava. He is believed to have converted king Vikramāditya to Jainism, 470 years after the *Nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra.[3] The Jainas believe that he was the spiritual tutor of that famous king, as is evident from the Kumāra-pāla-caritra and other works.

It may be noted here that Vikramāditya of Ujjainī has been considered by some scholars to be identical with Yaśodharma Deva, king of Malwa, who, according to Alberuni, had defeated the Huns at Korur in 533 A.D. The Chinese pilgrim Hwen-tshang (Yuan chwang), who came to India in 629 A.D., says that a very powerful king [presumably Vikramāditya] reigned 60 years[4] before his arrival there. From these it appears that Siddha Sena Divākara, who was a contemporary of Vikramāditya, must have lived at Ujjainī about 550 A.D.

---

[1] पंचेव य वरिससए सिद्धसेण दिवायरो य जयपयडो ।
छच्चसए वीसहिए सक्कथुओ अज्जरक्खिय पहू ॥ २६ ॥

(Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, p. 272.)

[2] Cf. Prabhāvakacaritra VIII, V, 57.

[3] See Klatt's Paṭṭāvalī of the Kharatara Gaccha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247.

[4] *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol. II, p. 26.

Legends and historical accounts point that Siddha Sena was the well-known *Kṣapaṇaka* (the Jaina sage), who adorned the court of Vikramāditya and was one of the Nine Gems (*Nava Ratna*).[1] Varāhamihira, the famous astronomer, who also was another of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikramāditya, lived between A.D. 505[2] and A.D. 587. We are told that Kṣapaṇaka *alias* Siddha Sena was a contemporary of Varāhamihira: so he must have flourished about the middle of the 6th century.

Candraprabha Sūri, author of Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti (?).

There is an excellent commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra called the **Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti** possibly by Candraprabha Sūri,[3] who also belonged to the S'vetāmbara sect and founded the Purṇimā Gaccha[4] in Saṁvat 1159 or A.D. 1102. He was a pupil of Jayasiṁha Sūri and preceptor of Dharmaghoṣa. He wrote another logical treatise called **Prameya-ratna-koṣa**[5] and a philosophical treatise called Darśana-śuddhi otherwise called Samyaktva-prakaraṇa. He was a great logician, and in controversy appeared as a lion before the opponents, who resembled elephants.[6] In

---

1 The Nine Gems are:—

धन्वन्तरिः क्षपणकोऽमरसिंहः शङ्कुर्वेतालभट्टघटखर्परकालिदासाः ।
ख्यातो वराहमिहिरो नृपतेः सभायां रत्नानि वै वररुचिर्नव विक्रमस्य ॥

(Jyotirvidābharaṇa).

2 *Vide* Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to Pañcasiddhāntikā, p. xxx. Varāhamihira chose S'aka 427 or A.D. 505 as the initial year of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived about that time. So—

सप्ताश्विवेद-संख्यं शककालमपास्य चैत्रशुक्लादौ ।
अर्द्धास्तमिते भानौ यवनपुरे सौम्य दिवसाद्ये ॥ ८ ॥

(Pañcasiddhāntikā, Chap. I, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhākara Dvivedi.)

3 For Candraprabha Sūri see Peterson's Fourth Report, p. xxvii, and Peterson 3, xvi. In the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti itself there is no mention of Candraprabha Sūri. I remember to have found somewhere that he was the author of it. The authorship of the Nyāyāvatāravivṛti must however for the present remain an open question. In the colophon of the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti it is stated that it was the work of Siddhasena-Divākara-vyākhyānaka, or simply Siddha-vyākhyānaka, which was evidently a surname. Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya, relying on the line व्याख्यातृचूडामणि-सिद्धनाम्नः (quoted from Ratnaprabha Sūri's Upadeśa-mālā-viśeṣa-vṛtti in Peterson's Third Report, p. 168) are inclined to identify Siddhavyākhyānaka with Siddharṣi who lived in Saṁvat 962 or 905 A.D. (as is evident from Peterson's Fourth Report, p. cxxix). There is another commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra by Haribhadra Sūri.

4 See Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report 1883-84, p. 147.

5 *Vide* Jaināgama List, Bombay, p. 77; and Peterson's Third Report on Sanskrit MSS., Appendix, p. 9.

6 तीर्थे वीरविभोः सुधर्मगणभृत् सन्तानलब्धोन्नति-
श्चारित्रोज्ज्वलचन्द्रगच्छजलधिप्रोल्लासशीतद्युतिः ।
साहित्यागमतर्कलक्षणमहाविद्यापगासागरः
श्रीचन्द्रप्रभसूरिरद्भुतमतिर्वादीभसिंहोऽभवत् ॥ १ ॥

(Daśavaikālika-ṭīkā by Tilakācārya, noticed in Peterson's Fifth Report, p. 65.)

the introduction to his Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti (q. v.) he has quoted the Buddhist logicians Dharmottara and Arcaṭa, and in the concluding lines has craved the mercy of Jina.

PRESIDENCY COLLEGE,
CALCUTTA :
*The* 12*th June*, 1908.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

## AN OBSERVATION.

*Mahāmahopādhyāya* Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣana maintains here that Siddhasena Divākara was identical with the well-known Kṣapaṇaka. This view perfectly commends itself to me. There is proof enough that Siddhasena was a Jaina sage and lived in the court of Vikramāditya. That Kṣapaṇaka was one of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikramāditya is also very widely known, and it remains only to prove that he was a Jaina sage. We have instances enough in the Pañcatantra and the Mahābhārata where the Jaina ascetics are nicknamed as Kṣapaṇaka. The following instances from the Avadānakalpalatā will show that the Buddhists also designated, rather nicknamed, the Jaina ascetics as Kṣapaṇaka :—

भगवद्भाषितं तत्तु सुभद्रेण निवेदितम् ।
श्रुत्वा क्षपणकः क्षिप्रमभूद् द्वेषविषाकुलः ॥ ९ ॥
तस्य सर्व्वज्ञतां वेत्ति सुभद्रो यदि मद्गिरा ।
तदेष क्षपणश्रद्धां त्यक्ष्यति श्रमणादरात् ॥ १२ ॥
मूर्खक्षपणभक्तेन तद्गिरा हतयोषिता ।
त्वया त्यक्तस्वपुत्रेण किं नाम सुकृता कृतम् ॥ ४० ॥

(Jyotiṣkāvadāna).

INDIAN RESEARCH SOCIETY,
CALCUTTA.

SARAT CHANDRA DAS.

# न्यायावतारः ।

## Nyāyāvatārah.

प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं बाधविवर्ज्जितम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्विधा मेयविनिश्चयात् ॥ १ ॥

प्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि व्यवहारश्च तत्कृतः ।
प्रमाणलक्षणस्योक्तौ ज्ञायते न प्रयोजनम् ॥ २ ॥

प्रसिद्धानां प्रमाणानां लक्षणोक्तौ प्रयोजनम् ।
तद्व्यामोहनिवृत्तिः स्याद् व्यामूढमनसामिह ॥ ३ ॥

अपरोक्षतयाऽर्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् ।
प्रत्यक्षमितरद् ज्ञेयं परोक्षं ग्रहणेक्षया ॥ ४ ॥

साध्याविनाभुनो लिङ्गात् साध्यनिश्चायकं स्मृतम् ।
अनुमानं तदभ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् समक्षवत् ॥ ५ ॥

न प्रत्यक्षमपि भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वविनिश्चयात् ।
भ्रान्तं प्रमाणमित्येतद् विरुद्धवचनं यतः ॥ ६ ॥

सकलप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितः स्फुटम् ।
प्रमाणं स्वान्यनिश्चायि द्वयसिद्धौ प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥ ७ ॥

दृष्टेष्टाव्याहताद्वाक्यात् परमार्थाभिधायिनः ।
तत्त्वग्राहितयोत्पन्नं मानं शाब्दं प्रकीर्त्तितम् ॥ ८ ॥

आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लङ्घ्यमदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् ।
तत्त्वोपदेशकृत् सार्वं शास्त्रं कापथघट्टनम् ॥ ९ ॥

स्वनिश्चयवदन्येषां निश्चयोत्पादनं बुधैः ।
परार्थं मानमाख्यातं वाक्यं तदुपचारतः ॥ १० ॥

प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन प्रसिद्धार्थप्रकाशनात् ।
परस्य तदुपायत्वात् परार्थत्वं द्वयोरपि ॥ ११ ॥

प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपन्नार्थप्रतिपादि च यद्वचः ।
प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिभासस्य निमित्तत्वात्तदुच्यते ॥ १२ ॥

साध्याविनाभुवो हेतोर्वचो यत् प्रतिपादकम् ।
परार्थमनुमानं तत् पक्षादिवचनात्मकम् ॥ १३ ॥

साध्याभ्युपगमः पक्षः प्रत्यक्षाद्यनिराकृतः ।
तत्प्रयोगोऽत्र कर्त्तव्यो हेतोर्गोचरदीपकः ॥ १४ ॥

अन्यथा वाद्यभिप्रेतहेतुगोचरमोहितः ।
प्रत्याय्यस्य भवेद्धेतुर्विरुद्धारेकितो यथा ॥ १५ ॥

धानुष्कगुणसंप्रेक्षिजनस्य परिविध्यतः ।
धानुष्कस्य विना लक्ष्यनिर्देशेन गुणेतरौ ॥ १६ ॥

हेतोस्तथोपपत्त्या वा स्यात् प्रयोगोऽन्यथापि वा ।
द्विविधोऽन्यतरेणापि साध्यसिद्धिर्भवेदिति ॥ १७ ॥

साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिर्यत्र निश्चीयतेतराम् ।
साधर्म्येण स दृष्टान्तः सम्बन्धस्मरणान्मतः ॥ १८ ॥

साध्ये निवर्त्तमाने तु साधनस्याप्यसम्भवः ।
ख्याप्यते यत्र दृष्टान्तो वैधर्म्येणेति स स्मृतः ॥ १९ ॥

अन्तर्व्याप्त्यैव साध्यस्य सिद्धेर्बहिरुदाहृतिः ।
व्यर्था स्यात्तदसद्भावेऽप्येवं न्यायविदो विदुः ॥ २० ॥

प्रतिपाद्यस्य यः सिद्धः पक्षाभासोऽस्ति लिङ्गतः ।
लोकस्ववचनाभ्यां च बाधितोऽनेकधा मतः ॥ २१ ॥

अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं हेतोर्लक्षणमीरितम् ।
तदप्रतीतिसन्देहविपर्य्यासैस्तदाभता ॥ २२ ॥

असिद्धस्त्वप्रतीतो यो योऽन्यथैवोपपद्यते ।
विरुद्धो योऽन्यथाप्यत्र युक्तोऽनैकान्तिकः स तु ॥ २३ ॥

साधर्म्येणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः ।
अपलक्षणहेतूत्थाः साध्यादिविकलादयः ॥ २४ ॥

वैधर्म्येणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः ।
साध्यसाधनयुग्मानामनिवृत्तेश्च संशयात् ॥ २५ ॥

वाद्युक्ते साधने प्रोक्तदोषाणामुद्भावनम् ।
दूषणं निरवद्ये तु दूषणाभासनामकम् ॥ २६ ॥

सकलावरणमुक्तात्म केवलं यत् प्रकाशते ।
प्रत्यक्षं सकलार्थात्मसततप्रतिभासनम् ॥ २७ ॥

प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्त्तनम् ।
केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः ॥ २८ ॥

अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।
एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥ २९ ॥

नयानामेकनिष्ठानां प्रवृत्तेः श्रुतवर्त्मनि ।
सम्पूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि स्याद्वादश्रुतमुच्यते ॥ ३० ॥

प्रमाता स्वान्यनिर्भासी कर्त्ता भोक्ता विवृत्तिमान् ।
स्वसंवेदनसंसिद्धो जीवः चित्याद्यनात्मकः ॥ ३१ ॥

प्रमाणादिव्यवस्थेयमनादिनिधनात्मिका ।
सर्वसंव्यवहर्त्तॄणां प्रसिद्धाऽपि प्रकीर्त्तिता ॥ ३१ ॥

कृतिरियं श्रीसितपट्टसिद्धसेनदिवाकरस्य ॥

# न्यायावतारविवृतिः ।

## Nyāyāvatāravivṛtiḥ.

### (Extracts)

अविपुतसामान्यविशेषदेशिनं वर्द्धमानमानम्य ।
न्यायावतारविवृतिः स्मृतिबीजविवृद्धये क्रियते ॥

'प्रमाणेत्यादि' अनेन च तादात्म्य-तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणसंबन्धविकलतया ध्वनेर्बहिरर्थं प्रति प्रामाण्यायोगात् अभिधेयादिसूचनद्वारोत्पन्नार्थसंशयमुखेन श्रोतारः श्रवणं प्रति प्रोत्साह्यन्ते इति धर्म्मोत्तरो मन्यते । ... अर्च्चटस्तु आह । न श्रावकोत्साहकमेतत् प्रामाण्याभावात् तेषां चाप्रमाणादप्रवृत्तेः ।

स्व आत्मा स्वरूपं, परोऽर्थः । तौ आभासयितुं प्रकाशयितुं शीलं यस्य तत् । तथा ज्ञायते निर्णीयते तत्त्वं येन तत् ज्ञानम् । बाध्यते अनेनेति बाधः, विपरीतार्थोपस्थापक-प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरिति यावत् । तेन विशेषेण वर्जितं रहितं यत् ज्ञानं तत् प्रमाणमिति संटंकः । स्वपराभासीत्यनेन ये स्वाभास्येव ज्ञानं मन्यन्ते ते ज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धविशेषाः ; ये च पराभास्येव मीमांसकनैयायिकादयः ; ते निरस्तास्ते हि बहिरर्थाभावात् ज्ञानं स्वांश-पर्य्यवसितसत्ताकम् इत्याचक्षीरन् । तदयुक्तम् । ज्ञेयार्थाभावे ज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गात् । ... ... पराभास्यपि स्वप्रकाशाभावात् अभिदधीरन् तदप्यसम्बद्धम् । स्वप्रकाशाभावे परप्रकाशा-योगात् ; न हि प्रदीपः स्वरूपमनुद्द्योतयन् घटाद्युद्द्योतने व्याप्रियते ।

तत्र सिद्धान्तप्रसिद्धपारमार्थिकप्रत्यक्षापेक्षयाऽक्षशब्दो जीवपर्य्यायतया प्रसिद्धः । इह तु व्यावहारिकप्रत्यक्षप्रस्तावात् अक्षध्वनिरिन्द्रियवचनो गृह्यते ततश्च अक्षं प्रति गतं प्रत्यक्षं यदिन्द्रियमाश्रित्य उज्जिहीते अर्थसाक्षात्कारिज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः । ... ... ततश्च सर्वज्ञानानां यत् स्वरूपसंवेदनं तदपि प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तं भवति । तत्रापि स्वरूपस्य ग्राह्यस्य साक्षात्करणसद्भावादिति । अक्षेभ्यः परतो वर्त्तते इति परोक्षमक्षव्यापारनिरपेक्षं मनोव्यापारेण असाक्षादर्थपरिच्छेदकं यत् ज्ञानं तत्परोक्षमिति भावः । ... ... द्विधैव ... द्वाभ्यामेव प्रकाराभ्यां मेयस्य ग्राह्यार्थस्य विनिश्चयात् स्वरूपनिर्णयात् ॥ १ ॥

प्रसिद्धानि प्ररूढानि, नाधुना साध्यानीत्यर्थः । प्रमाणानि प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दानि । ... ... यदर्थं प्रमाणपरीक्षणं असावपि जलपानशीतत्राणादिर्व्यवहारोऽनादिप्ररूढः । तन्निरर्थकं प्रमाणलक्षणाभिधानमिति ॥ २ ॥

यद्यपि प्रतिप्राणिप्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि । अन्यथा तत्कृतनिखिलव्यवहारोच्छेद-प्रसंगात्तदुच्छेदे च दृष्टहान्याद्यापत्तेः । ... व्यामूढं विपरीतग्रस्तं विचित्रतां गतं मनोऽन्तः-करणं येषां ते तथा तेषाम्, इहेति लोके । ... यद्यनादिप्रसिद्धं प्रमाणलक्षणं प्रति न केचित् अपि व्यामुह्येयुस्तदा यद्व भवद्भिः प्रागुदग्राहि निरर्थकं प्रमाणलक्षणमिति तद्व युक्तमेव स्यात् । न चैतदेवम्, तत्र व्यामूढानां दर्शनात् ॥ ३ ॥

परोक्षोऽक्षगोचरातीतस्ततोऽन्योऽपरोक्षस्तद्भावस्तत्ता तया साक्षात्कृततयेति यावत्। तस्य [ अर्थस्य ] ग्राहकं व्यवसायात्मकतया साक्षात् परिच्छेदकं यत् ज्ञानं तदीदृशमिति ईदृगेव प्रत्यक्षमिति संटंकः। ... अर्थस्य ग्राहकमित्यस्य ग्रहणेक्षयेति वक्ष्यमाणपद-सापेक्षत्वादमुना बहिरपि येऽर्थकालाकलनविकलं सकलमपि ज्ञानं प्रलपन्ति तान्निरस्यति। ... ... ग्राहकमिति च निर्णायकं द्रष्टव्यं निर्णयाभावेऽर्थग्रहणायोगात्। तेन यत् तथागतैः प्रत्यपादि प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तमिति तदपास्तं भवति। तस्य युक्तिरिक्तत्वात्। तथाहि, ते निर्विकल्पकत्वेऽध्यक्षस्य युक्ताः खेटयन्ति किलेदमर्थसामर्थ्येनोदीयते सन्निहितार्थक्रिया-समर्थार्थग्राहकत्वात्। ... तस्मात् [ प्रत्यक्षात् ] इतरत् असाक्षादर्थग्राहकं ज्ञानं परोक्ष-मिति ज्ञेयमवगन्तव्यमेतदपि स्वसंवेदनापेक्षया प्रत्यक्षमेव। बहिरर्थापेक्षया तु परोक्ष-व्यपदेशमश्नुते इति दर्शयन्नाह ग्रहणेक्षयेति। इह ग्रहणं प्रक्रमाद् बहिःप्रवर्त्तनमुच्यते। अन्यथा विशेषणवैयर्थ्यात् तस्येक्षापेक्षतया बहिःप्रवृत्तिपर्य्यालोचनयेति यावत्। तदयमर्थो यद्यपि स्वयं प्रत्यक्षं तथापि लिंगशब्दादिद्वारेण बहिर्विषयग्रहणेऽसाक्षात्कारितया व्याप्रि-यते इति परोक्षमित्युच्यते। ... तद्यथा अनुमानं शाब्दं चेति॥ ४॥

साध्याविनाभुन इत्यनेन परप्रणीतलिंगलक्षणव्युदासमाचष्टे। ततश्च यत् परे प्रोचुः। पक्षधर्म्मान्वयव्यतिरेकलक्षणरूपत्रयोपलक्षितानि त्रीणि एव लिंगानि अनुपलब्धिः स्वभावः कार्य्यंचेति। तदुक्तं "अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये सद्भावो नास्तिताऽसति। निश्चितानुपलम्भा-त्मकार्य्याख्या हेतवस्त्रयः"॥ इति॥

तथाऽन्येऽप्येदं कार्य्यं कारणं संयोगि समवायि विरोधि चेति लिंगिकमिति। तथा पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टमित्यादि। तद्बालप्रलपितप्रायमित्यवगन्तव्यम्। पक्षधर्मत्व-विरहेऽपि अनुमिमीमहे कालादिकमूत्रधर्म्मौ समस्त्येव तत्र पक्षधर्मता लिंगस्य गृह्यते इति चेत् न, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। एवं हि शब्दस्य अनित्यत्वे साध्ये काककार्ष्ण्यादेरपि गमकत्व-प्रसक्तेः। तत्रापि लोकादेर्धर्मिणः कल्पयितुं शक्यत्वात्। ... अधुना यत् शौद्धोदनशिष्य-कैर्न्यगादि यदुत भ्रान्तमनुमानं सामान्यप्रतिभासित्वात् तस्य च बहिः स्वलक्षणे व्यतिरेका-व्यतिरेकविकल्पाभ्यामपाक्रियमाणतया योगात्तद्रूपतया वत न तस्याध्यवसायादतस्मिन् तद्-ग्रहस्य च भ्रान्तिलक्षणत्वात् ... तदुक्तम् "अतस्मिन् तद्ग्रहो भ्रान्तिरपि संबन्धतः प्रमा" इति तदपाकर्त्तुमाह तदभ्रान्तमित्यादि॥ ५॥

न केवलमनुमानं भ्रान्तं किं तर्हि यद्भवद्भिः दृष्टान्ततया उपात्तं प्रत्यक्षं तदपि भ्रान्तमेव "सर्वमालम्बने भ्रान्तम्" इति वचनात्। ... लोकसंवृतिं घटयन्तो वयं दृढतर-वासनाप्रबोधसंपादितसत्ताकयोः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः प्रमाणतामाचक्ष्महे॥ ६॥

सकलप्रतिभासस्य समस्तसंवेदनस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितो विपर्य्यस्तत्वानिष्पत्तेः यत् स्फुटं स्वान्यनिश्चायि सुनिश्चिततया स्वपरप्रकाशकं तत् प्रमाणमिति सम्बन्धः। तच्च द्वयसिद्धौ स्वरूपार्थलक्षणयुग्मनिष्पत्तौ प्रसिध्यति निष्पद्यते नान्यथा प्रमेयाभावे प्रमाणाभावात्॥ ७॥

दृष्टेन प्रमाणावलोकितेन इष्टः प्रतिपिपादयिषितोऽव्याहतोऽनिराकृतः सामर्थ्यादर्थो यस्मिन् वाक्ये तत् तथा प्रमाणनिश्चितार्थाबाधितमिति यावत्। तस्मात् परमोऽकृत्रिमः पुरुषोपयोगी शक्यानुष्ठानो वाऽर्थो वाच्यस्तमभिधातुं शीलं यस्य तत् परमार्थाभिधायि विशिष्टार्थदर्शकमित्यर्थः। ततस्तत्त्वग्राहितया उत्पन्नं प्रकृतवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यार्थादानशीलतया लब्धात्मसत्ताकं यन्मानं तत् शाब्दमिति प्रकीर्त्तितम्। ... तदप्रामाण्ये परार्थानुमानप्रलय-

प्रसंगात् तस्य वचनरूपत्वात्। ... शाब्दं च द्विधा भवति। लौकिकं शास्त्रजं च। ... यादृशः शास्त्रात् तज्जातं प्रमाणतामनुभवति तद्दर्शयति ॥ ८ ॥

आप्तः प्रक्षीणाशेषरागादिदोषगणस्तेनोपज्ञम् आदौ उपलब्धम् अनेन अपौरुषेयापोहमाह; तस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वात् पुरुषव्यापाराभावे वचनानुपलब्धेरुपलम्भेऽपि तदर्थानवगमात् तदर्थनिश्चयार्थं पुरुषाश्रयणे गजस्नानन्यायप्रसंगात्। ... उल्लङ्घ्यते प्राबल्येन गम्यते अभिभूयते अन्यैरित्युल्लङ्घ्यं ततोऽन्यदनुल्लङ्घ्यं सर्ववचनातिशायीति यावत्। ... दृष्टेन प्रमाणनिर्णीतेन इष्टस्य तद्वाच्यस्य विरोधो यस्मिन् तत् तथा तदेव। यदि चादृष्टः प्रमाणेन इष्टो वचनान्तरेण तयोर्विरोधकं तद्विरुद्धार्थाभिधानात्। ततोऽन्यत् अदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् अबाधार्थाभिधायीत्यर्थः। ... तत्त्वं जीवादयः पदार्थाः प्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितत्वात् तेषाम् उपदेशः स्वरूपप्रकाशनं तद्रक्षणादिविधानं वा तं करोतीति तत्त्वोपदेशकृत् अतएव सार्वं सर्वस्मै हितं ...। कुत्सिताः पन्थानः कापथास्तीर्थान्तराणि तेषां घट्टनं विचालकं निराकारकं सर्वजनापकारिकुमतविध्वंसकमित्यर्थः ॥ ९ ॥

स्व आत्मा तस्य निश्चयः प्रमेयाधिगमः तद्वदन्येषां प्रतिपाद्यानां निश्चयोत्पादनं प्रमेयपरिच्छेदकज्ञानप्रादुर्भावनं यथाऽऽत्मनोऽर्थनिर्णयस्तथा परेषां निर्णयजननमित्यर्थः। बुधैर्विद्वद्भिः परस्मै अर्थः प्रयोजनं येन तत् परार्थं मीयतेऽनेनेति मानम्। ननु च यदि निश्चयोत्पादनं परार्थमानं तदा ज्ञानमपि परप्रत्यायनाय व्याप्रियमाणं परार्थं प्राप्नोतीत्याह। वाक्यं परार्थं न ज्ञानं तस्यैव आनन्तर्य्येण व्यापारात् परप्रयोजनमात्रत्वाच्च इतरस्य तु व्यवहितत्वात् स्वपरोपकारित्वात् च। कथं वचनमज्ञानरूपं प्रमाणमित्याह। तदुपचारतस्तस्य ज्ञानस्य उपचारो ऽतद्रूपस्यापि तदङ्गतया तद्रूपत्वेन ग्रहणम् ततः इदम् उक्तं भवति प्रतिपाद्यगतमुत्पत्स्यमानं यत् ज्ञानं तदव्यवहितकारणत्वात् वचनमपि उपचारेण प्रमाणमित्युच्यते ॥ १० ॥

प्रत्यक्षेणापि अनुमानेनेव प्रसिद्धार्थप्रकाशनात् स्वप्रतीतप्रमेयप्रत्यायनात् परार्थत्वं प्रतिपाद्यप्रयोजनत्वं द्वयोरपि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोस्तुल्यकारणत्वान्नानुमानस्यैवैकस्येत्यभिप्रायः। ... तद्यथाऽनुमानप्रतीतोऽर्थः परस्मै प्रतिपाद्यमानो वचनरूपापन्नः परार्थमनुमानम् तथा प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतोऽपि परार्थं प्रत्यक्षं परप्रत्यायनस्य तुल्यत्वात् वचनव्यापारस्यैव भेदात्। तथाह्यनुमानप्रतीतं प्रत्यायन्नेवं वचनयति। अग्निरत्र धूमात्। यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निः। यथा महानसादौ। वैधर्म्येण वा अग्न्यभावे न क्वचिद्‌ धूमो यथा जलाशयादौ। तथा च धूमोऽयं तस्मात् धूमादग्निरत्रेति। ... प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतं पुनर्दर्शयन् एतावद्वक्ति। पश्य राजा गच्छति। ततश्च वचनात् विविधादपि समग्रसामग्रीकस्य प्रतिपाद्यस्य अनुमेयप्रत्यक्षार्थविषया यतः प्रतीतिरुल्लसत्यतो द्वयोरपि परार्थता इत्याह च। परस्य तदुपायत्वात् प्रतिपाद्यस्य प्रतीतिप्रतिपादकस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमाननिर्णीतार्थप्रकाशनकारणत्वादित्यर्थः। एतेन पूर्वकारिकोक्तोपचारकारणं च लक्षयति ॥ ११ ॥

यद्वचः प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपन्नार्थप्रतिपादि साक्षात्कारिज्ञानगोचरकथनचतुरं तत् प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते। ... वचनं कुतः प्रत्यक्षमित्याह। प्रतिभासस्य निमित्तत्वात् प्रतिपाद्यप्रत्यक्षप्रकाशहेतुत्वाद्‌ उपचारेण उच्यते ॥ १२ ॥

पक्षो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणः स आदिर्येषां हेतुदृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमादीनां तानि तथा तेषां वचनानि प्रतिपादका ध्वनयः तान्येवात्मस्वरूपं यस्य तत्पक्षादिवचनात्मकं न तु च

हेतुप्रतिपादकं वचः परार्थमनुमानमित्यभिधाय तत्पक्षादिवचनात्मकमिति वदतः पूर्वापरव्याहता वाचोयुक्तिः। नैतदस्ति। एवं मन्यते। नैकः प्रकारः परार्थानुमानस्य किं तर्हि यथा परस्य सुखेन प्रमेयप्रतीतिर्भवति तथा यत्र सः प्रत्यायनीयः तत्र दशावयवसाधनं प्रतिपादनोपायः तद्यथा पक्षादयः पञ्च तच्छुद्धयश्च ॥ १३ ॥

साध्यस्य अनुमेयस्य अभ्युपगमोऽङ्गीकरणं प्राश्निकादीनां पुरतः प्रतिज्ञास्वीकार इत्यर्थः। ... प्रत्यक्षाद्यनिराकृत इति प्रत्यक्षं साक्षात्कारिसंवेदनमादिशब्दादनुमानस्ववचनलोका गृह्यन्ते तैः अनिराकृतः अबाधितः। ... तद्यथा सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकम् अस्तिसर्वज्ञ इत्यादि। तस्य पक्षस्य प्रयोगोऽभिधानमत्र परार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे कर्त्तव्यो विधेयः। हेतोगोचरदीपक इति निर्देशस्य विषयसंदर्शकत्वात् इत्यर्थः ॥ १४ ॥

अन्यथेत्युक्तविपरीताश्रयणे पक्षप्रयोगाकरणे इत्यर्थः। वादिनो हेतूपन्यासकर्त्तुरभिप्रेतोऽभिमतः स चासौ हेतुगोचरश्च वाद्यभिप्रेतहेतुगोचरस्तत्र मुह्यति दोलायते तच्छीलश्च यस्तस्य प्रत्यायस्य प्रतिवादिनो हेतुर्विरुद्धारेकितो भवेत् विरोधशङ्काकलङ्कितः स्यादित्यर्थः। ततश्च सम्यग् हेतावपि विपक्षे एवायं वर्त्तते इति व्यामोहात् विरुद्धदूषणमभिदधीत। पक्षोपन्यासात्तु निर्णीतहेतुगोचरस्य नैष दोषः स्यादित्यभिप्रायः। अमुमेवार्थं स्पष्टं दृष्टान्तेनाह ॥ १५ ॥

यथा लक्ष्यनिर्देशं विना धानुष्कस्य इषुं प्रक्षिपतो यौ गुणदोषौ तौ तद्दर्शिजनस्य विपर्य्यस्तावपि प्रतिभातः। गुणोऽपि दोषतया दोषोऽपि वा गुणतया तथा पक्षनिर्देशं विना हेतुमुपन्यस्यतो वादिनो यौ स्वाभिप्रेतसाध्यसाधनसमर्थत्वासमर्थत्वलक्षणौ गुणदोषौ तौ प्राश्निकप्रतिवाद्यादीनां विपरीतावपि प्रतिभात इति भावार्थः ॥ १६ ॥

स्वार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे हि परप्रणीतलक्षणान्तरव्यपोहेन साध्यव्यतिरेकात् सामस्त्येन हेतोर्व्यावृत्तिरेवैकं लक्षणमिति निर्णीतं परार्थानुमानेनापि तदेव प्रकाशनीयं वचनरचना तु क्वचित् प्रवर्त्तते इत्यभिप्रायवांस्तद्द्वैविध्यमाह। हेतो र्द्विविधः प्रयोगः स्यादिति सम्बन्धः। कथमित्याह। तथैव साध्यसद्भावे एव उपपत्तिर्विद्यमानता तया तथोपपत्त्या यथा अग्निरत्र धूमस्य तथैव उपपत्तेरिति। अन्यथापि वा इत्यनेनावयवे समुदायोपचारात् अन्यथानुपपत्तिं लक्षयति अन्यथा साध्यव्यतिरेके अनुपपत्तिः अविद्यमानता एव तया वा अन्यथानुपपत्त्या हेतोः प्रयोगः स्यात्। यथा अग्निरत्र धूमस्य अन्यथानुपपत्तिरिति एते च द्वे अपि एकस्मिन् साध्ये प्रयोक्तव्ये इति मन्येत। ... तथोपपत्तिप्रयोगेण अन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्यप्रयोगेण वा साध्यस्य प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्थस्य सिद्धिर्निष्पत्तिः ... भवेत्॥ १७ ॥

साध्यं जिज्ञासितार्थात्मकं साधनं तद्गमको हेतुः तयोः साध्यसाधनयोः व्याप्तिः इदमनेन विना न भवतीत्येवंरूपा यत्र क्वचिन्निश्चीयतेतराम् अतिशयेन निर्णीयते स साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः। यथा अग्निरत्र धूमस्य तथैव उपपत्तेः महानसादिवत्। इत्ययं च अविस्मृतप्रतिबन्धे प्रतिवादिनि न प्रयोक्तव्य इत्याह ॥ १८ ॥

साध्ये गम्ये निवर्त्तमाने असंभवति तु शब्दोऽवधारणार्थो भिन्नक्रमः स च साधनस्य असंभव एव इत्यत्र द्रष्टव्यः। ख्याप्यते प्रतिपाद्यते यत्र क्वचित् दृष्टान्ते स वैधर्म्येण भवति इति शब्देन सम्बन्धस्मरणात् इति इदमत्रापि संबध्नाति अस्यापि स्मर्य्यमाणे संबन्धे अप्रयोगात् इति किमर्थं विस्मृतसंबन्धे एव प्रतिवादिनि दृष्टान्तः प्रयुज्यते नान्यदेति परवचनावकाशमाशङ्कयाह ॥ १९ ॥

अन्यदा हि स्मर्यमाणे वा संबन्धे अप्रयुज्येतागृहीते वा ... ततश्च अन्तः पक्षमध्ये व्याप्तिः साधनस्य साध्याक्रान्तत्वम् अन्तर्व्याप्तिस्तस्यैव साध्यसंगम्यसंसिद्धेः प्रतीतेः बहिर्विवक्षितधर्मिणोऽन्यत्र दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि उदाहृतिः व्याप्तिदर्शनरूपा व्यर्था निष्प्रयोजना। तदसद्भावेऽप्येव संबन्धाद् ग्रहणाद् अन्तर्व्याप्त्यभावेऽप्येवमिति व्यर्थैव बहिरुदाहृतिः। नहि सहदर्शनात्। क्वचित् सर्वत्र तद्रूपता सिध्यति व्यभिचारदर्शनात्। तस्माद् अगृहीतसम्बन्धे प्रतिपाद्ये प्रमाणे न प्रतिबन्धः। साध्यस्तत्सिद्धौ तत एव साध्यसिद्धेरकिञ्चित्करी दृष्टान्तोदाहृतिरिति न्यायविद्वांसो विदुरवबुध्यन्ते इति। इह च प्रकरणे शेषावयवानां उपनयनिगमनशुद्धिपञ्चकलक्षणानां संक्षिप्तरुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहपरत्वात् अस्य यद्यपि साक्षाल्लक्षणं नोक्तं तथाप्यत एव प्रतिपादितावयवत्रयं बुद्धिमद्भिरुन्नेयम्। यतोऽवयवापेक्षया जघन्यमध्यमोत्कृष्टाः तिस्रः कथा भवन्ति इति। तत्र हेतुप्रतिपादनमात्रं जघन्या, द्व्याद्यवयवनिवेदनं मध्यमा, संपूर्णदशावयवकथनमुत्कृष्टा। तत्र इह मध्यमायाः साक्षात् कथनेन जघन्योत्कृष्टे अर्थतः सूचयति; तत्सद्भावस्य प्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् इति ॥ २० ॥

प्रतिपाद्यस्य प्रतिवादिनः यः कश्चित् सिद्धः प्रतीतावारूढ एव स पक्षाभासः। साध्यस्यैव पक्षत्वात् सिद्धस्य साधनानर्हत्वाद् अतिप्रसक्तेस्तथाऽक्षलिंगतोऽध्यक्षहेतुभ्यां लोकस्ववचनाभ्यां च बाधितस्तिरस्कृतो यः स पक्षाभासस्तत्र प्रतिपाद्यसिद्धो यथा पौद्गलिको घटः। सौगतं वा प्रति सर्वं क्षणिकमित्यादि। प्रत्यक्षबाधितो यथा निरंशानि स्वलक्षणानि परस्परविविक्तौ वा सामान्यविशेषाविति। अनुमानबाधितो यथा नास्ति सर्वज्ञ इति। लोकबाधितो यथा गम्या माता इति। स्ववचनबाधितो यथा न सन्ति सर्वे भावा इति ॥ २१ ॥

हेतोर्लक्षणम् असाधारणधर्मरूपं यदीरितं गमितम् अनेकार्थत्वाद्वा धातोः प्रतिपादितं स्वार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे। यदुतान्यथानुपपन्नत्वमिति। तस्य अप्रतीतिरनध्यवसायः, संदेहो दोलायमानता, विपर्यासो वैपरीत्यनिर्णयोऽप्रतीतिश्च संदेहश्च विपर्यासश्चेति द्वन्द्वः। तदाभता हेत्वाभासता ॥ २२ ॥

यः कश्चिदप्रतीतः प्रतीत्याऽगोचरीकृतोऽनिश्चितः सोऽसिद्धनामा हेत्वाभासः। ... यस्तु अन्यथैव साध्यं विनैव विपक्ष एवेति यावत् उपपद्यते सम्भवति स विरुद्धाभिधानः। यः पुनः अन्यथापि साध्यविपर्ययेणापि युक्तो घटमानकोऽपि शब्दात् साध्येनापि सोऽत्र व्यतिकरेऽनैकान्तिकसंज्ञो ज्ञातव्य इति। तत्र प्रतिप्राणिप्रसिद्धप्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितानेकान्तविरुद्धबुद्धिभिः कणभक्षाक्षपादबुद्धादिशिष्यकैरुपन्यस्यमानाः सर्व एव हेतवः। तद्यथा एकान्तेन नित्यः शब्दोऽनित्यो वा। सत्त्वात् उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् कृतकत्वात् प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् इत्यादि। ... कल्पनारचितसत्ताकानां च सर्वशक्तिविरहरूपतया निःस्वभावत्वात्। तथापि तेषां साधनत्वे साध्यमपि निःस्वभावमिति। खरविषाणं शशविषाणस्य साधनमापद्यते इति शोभनः साध्यसाधनव्यवहारः। ... एवं हि नभःपुण्डरीकं तत्र नास्तीति सत्तादिकमपि कल्पयितुं न शक्यमिति प्रसज्येत। ... अनित्यवादी नित्यवादिनं प्रति प्रमाणयति। सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्त्वात् ... ... नित्यवादी पुनः एवं प्रमाणयति। सर्वं नित्यं सत्त्वात्। तस्माद् अमी सर्व एव हेतवः सन्तोऽनेकान्तमन्तरेण नोपपद्यन्ते इति तमेव प्रतिपादयितुम् ईशते विमूढबुद्धिभिः पुनः विपक्षसाधनार्थम् उपन्यस्यमाना विवक्षया असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकतामाबिभ्रतीति स्थितम् ॥ २३ ॥

दृष्टान्तदोषा दृष्टान्ताभासा इत्यर्थः। ... साध्यं गम्यम् आदिशब्दात् साधनोभय-

परिग्रहः। तद्विकलास्तच्छून्याः आदिशब्दात् सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनोभयधर्म्मा गृह्यन्ते। किंभूता एते इत्याह। अपगतं लक्षणं येभ्यस्ते तथा च ते हेतवश्च तेभ्य उत्था उत्थानं येषां ते अपलक्षणहेतूत्थाः। इदं च प्रायकं विशेषणं, सम्यग्हेतावपि वक्तृदोषवशात् दृष्टान्ताभासतोपपत्तेः यथा नित्यानित्यः शब्दः श्रावणत्वात् घटवदिति। तत्र साध्यविकलो यथा, भ्रान्तम् अनुमानं प्रमाणत्वात् प्रत्यक्षवत् प्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रान्तताविकलत्वात् ... ...। साधनविकलो यथा, जाग्रत्संवेदनं भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् स्वप्नसंवेदनवत् स्वप्नसंवेदनस्य प्रमाणतावैकल्यात् ...। उभयविकलो यथा, नास्ति सर्वज्ञः प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुपलब्धत्वात् घटवत् घटस्य सत्त्वात् प्रत्यक्षादिभिरुपलब्धत्वाच्च। सन्दिग्धसाध्यधर्म्मो यथा, वीतरागोऽयं मरणधर्मत्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् रथ्यापुरुषे वीतरागत्वस्य सन्दिग्धत्वात् ...। सन्दिग्धसाधनधर्म्मो यथा, मरणधर्मोऽयं पुरुषो रागादिमत्त्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् द्रष्टव्यः पुरुषे रागादिमत्त्वस्य सन्दिग्धत्वात् वीतरागस्यापि तथा सम्भवादिति। सन्दिग्धोभयधर्म्मो यथा, असर्वज्ञोऽयं रागादिमत्त्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् इति रथ्यापुरुषे प्रदर्शितन्यायेन उभयस्यापि सन्दिग्धत्वादिति। ननु च परैरन्यदपि दृष्टान्ताभासत्रयमुक्तं तद्यथा अनन्वयोऽप्रदर्शितान्वयो विपरीतान्वयश्चेति। तत्र अनन्वयो यथा, रागादिमान् विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वाद् इष्टपुरुषवदिति यद्यपि किलेष्टपुरुषे रागादिमत्त्वं वक्तृत्वं च साध्यसाधनधर्म्मौ दृष्टौ तथापि यो यो वक्ता स स रागादिमानिति व्याप्त्यसिद्धेरनन्वयोऽयं दृष्टान्तः। तथा अप्रदर्शितान्वयो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् घटवदिति। अत्र यद्यपि वास्तवोऽन्वयोऽस्ति तथापि वादिना वचनेन न प्रकाशित इति अप्रदर्शितान्वयो दृष्टान्तः। विपरीतान्वयो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् इति। हेतुमभिधाय यदनित्यं तत् कृतकं घटवदिति विपरीतव्याप्तिदर्शनात् विपरीतान्वयः ॥ २४ ॥

साध्याभावः साधनाभावव्याप्तौ दर्शयितुमभिप्रेयते यस्मिन् तद्द्वैधर्म्यम्। तेनात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिता इति दक्षार्थं साध्यसाधनयुग्मानां गम्यगमकोभयानाम् अनिवृत्तेः अविवर्त्तनात् चशब्दस्य व्यवहितप्रयोगत्वात् संशयाच्च निवृत्तिसंदेहाच्चेत्यर्थः। तदनेन षड् दृष्टान्ताभासाः सूचिताः। तद्यथा साध्याव्यतिरेकी (१), साधनाव्यतिरेकी (२), साध्यसाधनाव्यतिरेकी (३), तथा सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः (४), सन्दिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकः (५), सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेकश्चेति (६)। तत्र साध्याव्यतिरेकी यथा, भ्रान्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वात् इत्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यत् पुनर्भ्रान्तं न भवति न तत् प्रमाणं तद्यथा स्वप्नज्ञानमिति स्वप्नज्ञानाद् भ्रान्ततानिवृत्तेः साध्याव्यतिरेकित्वमिति। साधनाव्यतिरेकी यथा, प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकं प्रमाणत्वादिति। अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यत् पुनः सविकल्पकं न तत् प्रमाणं तद्यथाऽनुमानमनुप्रमाणताऽनिवृत्तेः साधनाव्यतिरेकित्वम्। उभयाव्यतिरेकी यथा, नित्यानित्यः शब्दः सत्त्वात् इत्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनर्न नित्यानित्यः स न सन् तद्यथा घटः घटादुभयस्यापि अव्यावृत्तेरुभयाव्यतिरेकित्वमिति। तथा सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः, असर्वज्ञा अनाप्ता वा कपिलादयः आर्य्यसत्यचतुष्टयाप्रतिपादकत्वादिति। अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः यः पुनः सर्वज्ञ आप्तो वा असौ आर्य्यसत्यचतुष्टयं प्रत्यपीपदत् तद्यथा शौद्धोदनिरिति। अयं च साध्यव्यतिरेकी वा आर्य्यसत्यचतुष्टयस्य दुःखसमुदयमार्गनिरोधलक्षणस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वेन तद्भाषकस्य असर्वज्ञतानाप्ततोपपत्तेः ... ... तस्मात् शौद्धोदनेः सकाशाद् असर्वज्ञतानाप्ततालक्षणस्य साध्यस्य व्यावृत्तिः सन्दिग्धेति सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकित्वमिति। सन्दिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेको यथा, अनादेयवाक्यः कश्चिद्विवक्षितः पुरुषो रागादिमत्त्वा-

दित्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनः आदेयवाक्यो न स रागादिमान् तद्यथा सुगत इति ... सुगतात् रागादिमत्त्वव्यावृत्तिसंशयात् सन्दिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकित्वमिति। सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेको यथा, वीतरागाः कपिलादयः करुणास्पदेषु अपि अकरुणापरीतचित्ततया दत्तनिजकमांसशकलत्वादिति। अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो ये पुनर्वीतरागास्ते करुणापरीतचित्ततया दत्तनिजमांसशकलाः तद्यथा बोधिसत्त्वा इत्यत्र साधनसाध्यधर्मयोर्बोधिसत्त्वेभ्यो व्यावृत्तिः सन्दिग्धा ततः प्रतिपादितप्रमाणवैकल्यात् न ज्ञायते किं ते रागादिमन्तः उत वीतरागास्तथाऽनुकम्प्येषु किं स्वपिशितखण्डानि दत्तवन्तो नेति वा अतः सन्दिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेकित्वमिति। परैः परेऽपि दृष्टान्ताभासास्त्रयो विमृश्यभाषितया दर्शितास्तद्यथाऽव्यतिरेकोऽप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकोऽविपरीतव्यतिरेकश्चेति। ते अस्माभिः अयुक्तत्वात्तु दर्शयितव्याः। तथाहि अव्यतिरेकस्तैर्दर्शितो यथा, अवीतरागः कश्चिद्व विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वादित्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनः वीतरागो न स वक्ता यथोपलखण्ड इति ; यद्यपि किलोपलखण्डाद्व उभयं व्यावृत्तं तथापि व्याप्त्या व्यतिरेकासिद्धेः अव्यतिरेकित्वमिति। ... तथाहि अप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकस्तैरुक्तो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् आकाशवदित्यत्र विद्यमानोऽपि व्यतिरेको वादिना वचनेन उद्भावित इति दुष्टता। विपरीतव्यतिरेकः पुनरभिहितो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद्व इत्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यदकृतकं तन्नित्यं भवति यथाऽऽकाशमिति इत्यत्र विपर्य्यस्तव्यकिरेकप्रदर्शनात् विपरीतव्यतिरेकित्वम् ॥ २५ ॥

साध्यते प्रतिपाद्यप्रतीतौ आरोप्यते तु मेयं येन तत् साधनं तच्च अनेकरूपं प्राक् प्रत्यपादि। तद्यथा। क्वचित् हेतुरेवैकः, क्वचित् पक्षहेतू, क्वचित् पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्ताः, क्वचित् ते एव सोपनयाः, क्वचित् सनिगमनाः, क्वचित् एकैकतच्छुद्धिवृद्ध्येति। ... तत्रेह सम्यक्साधनस्य दूषयितुमशक्यत्वात् साधनाभास एव तत्सामर्थ्योपपत्तेः ... । तत्र प्रोक्तदोषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिनिराकृतपक्षासिद्धादिहेतुसाध्यादिविकलदृष्टान्ताद्युपन्यासलक्षणानामुद्भावनं प्राश्निकानां पुरतः प्रकाशनं यत् तद्व दूष्यते स्वाभिप्रेतसाध्यप्रत्यायनवैकल्यलक्षणं विकृतिं नीयते साधनमनेनेति दूषणमिति ज्ञेयम् ॥ २६ ॥

सकलं समस्तम् आवृणोति आव्रियते वा अनेनेत्यावरणम्। तत् स्वरूपप्रच्छादनं कर्मेत्यर्थः। सकलं च तदावरणं च सकलावरणं तेन मुक्तो रहितः आत्मा स्वरूपं यस्य तत् तथा। अतएव केवलम् असहायम् आवरणक्षयोपशमविचित्रतयैव बोधस्य नानाकारस्य प्रवृत्तेः। सामस्त्येन पुनः आवरणनिर्दलने विबन्धकारणवैकल्याद्व एकाकारतयैव तस्य विवर्त्तनाद्व अतो ज्ञानान्तरनिरपेक्षं यत् प्रकाशते प्रथते निरुपाधिकं द्योतते इत्यर्थः। तत् परमार्थतः प्रत्यक्षं तदिदं सकलावरणमुक्तात्मेति हेतुद्वारेण तथा केवलं तत् प्रकाशते इति स्वरूपतो निरूप्य अधुना कार्य्यद्वारेण निरूपयन्नाह। सकलार्थात्मनां समस्तवस्तुस्वरूपाणां सततप्रतिभासनम् अनवरतप्रकाशनं सकलार्थात्मसततप्रतिभासनमिति प्रतिभास्यतेऽनेनेति प्रतिभासनम् आत्मनो धर्मरूपतया भेदवद्विवक्षितं ज्ञानमिति यावत्। अस्य च पारमार्थिकत्वं निरुपचरितशब्दार्थोपपत्तेः। तथाहि। अक्षशब्दो जीवपर्य्यायस्ततश्चाक्षं प्रति वर्त्तते इति प्रत्यक्षं यत्रात्मनः साक्षाद्व्यापारः। व्यावहारिकं पुनरिन्द्रियव्यवहितात्मव्यापारसम्पाद्यत्वात् परमार्थतः परोक्षमेव धूमादग्निज्ञानवत्तिरोधानाविशेषात् ॥ २७ ॥

द्विविधं हि प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षाद्व असाक्षाच्च अनन्तरं व्यवहितं चेत्यर्थः। तत्र साक्षाद्व अज्ञानम् अनध्यवसायः प्रमेयापरिच्छित्तिस्तस्य विनिवर्त्तनं विशेषेण प्रलयापादनं प्रमाणस्य फलम् अज्ञानोद्दलनद्वारेण तस्य प्रवृत्तेः तस्य सर्वानर्थमूलतया प्रमात्रपकारित्वात् तन्निवर्त्तनस्य

प्रयोजनता युक्तैव। एतच्चानन्तरप्रयोजनं सर्वज्ञानामेकरूपत्वात् सामान्येनोक्तम्। व्यवहितप्रयोजनं पुनः विभागेनाह। केवलस्य सर्वज्ञज्ञानस्य सुखं वैषयिकं सुखातीत-परमाह्लादानुभव उपेक्षा साक्षात् समस्तार्थानुभवेऽपि हानोपादानोपादानेच्छाभावान्मध्यस्थ-वृत्तिता ते सुखोपेक्षे फलमित्यर्थः। शेषस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तप्राकृतलोकप्रमाणस्य आदानं ग्रहणं हानं परित्यागस्तयोरादानहानयोर्धीः बुद्धिरादानहानधीः, सा फलमिति यावत्। ततश्च आदेयानां सम्यग्दर्शनस्रक्चन्दनादीनां या आदित्सा तथा, हेयानां मिथ्यादर्शनादि-विषकण्टकानां या जिहासा प्रमाणसाध्या प्रमाणात्तत्सिद्धेः॥ २८॥

अनेके बहवोऽन्ता अंशा धर्म्मा वा आत्मनः स्वरूपाणि यस्य तद् अनेकात्मकं किं तद्वस्तु बहिरन्तश्च गोचरः विषयः सर्वसंविदां समस्तसंवित्तीनामनेन अनेकान्तमन्तरेण संवेदनप्रसरव्यवच्छेदं दर्शयति ...। एक इत्यादि अनन्तधर्माध्यासितं वस्तु साभिप्रेतैक-धर्मविशिष्टं नयति प्रापयति संवेदनमारोहयतीति नयः प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेरुत्तरकालभावी परामर्श इत्यर्थस्तस्य विषयः प्रमाणस्य गोचरो मतोऽभिप्रेत एकदेशेन अनित्यत्वादिधर्म-लक्षणेन विशिष्टः पररूपेभ्यो व्यवच्छिन्नेत्यर्थः। ... सर्वसंग्राहिसत्ताभिप्रायपरिकल्पना-द्वारेण सप्त नयाः प्रतिपादिताः, तद्यथा। नैगम-संग्रह-व्यवहार-ऋजुसूत्र-शब्द-समभिरूढ-एवंभूता नया इत्यतोऽस्माभिरपि ते एव वर्ण्यन्ते कथमेते सर्वाभिप्रायसंग्राहकाः इति चेत्। उच्यते। इति प्रायस्तावद् अर्थद्वारेण शब्दद्वारेण वा प्रवर्त्तेत गत्यन्तराभावात्। अर्थश्च सामान्यरूपो विशेषरूपो वा शब्दोऽपि रूढितो व्युत्पत्तितश्च व्युत्पत्तिरपि सामान्यनिमित्त-प्रयुक्ता तत्कालभाविनिमित्तप्रयुक्ता वा स्यात्। ... येऽपि परस्परविशकलितौ सामान्यविशेषौ इच्छन्ति तत् समुदायरूपो नैगमः। ये पुनः केवलं सामान्यं वाञ्छन्ति तत् समूहसंपाद्यः संग्रहः। ये पुनरनपेक्षितशास्त्रीयसामान्यविशेषं लोकव्यवहार-मवतरन्तं घटादिकं पदार्थम् अभिप्रयन्ति तन्निचयजात्या व्यवहारः। ये तु क्षणक्षयिणः परमाणुलक्षणा विशेषाः सत्या इति मन्यन्ते तत्संघातघटित ऋजुसूत्र इति। तथा ये रूढितः शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिं वाञ्छन्ति तन्निवहसाध्यः शब्द इति। ये तु व्युत्पत्तितो ध्वनीनां प्रवृत्तिं वाञ्छन्ति नान्यथा तद्द्वारजन्यं समभिरूढ इति। ये तु वर्त्तमानकाल-भाविव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमधिकृत्य शब्दाः प्रवर्त्तन्ते नान्यथेति मन्यन्ते तत्संघटितः खल्वेवं-भूत इति। तदेवं न कश्चन विकल्पोऽस्ति वस्तुगोचरो योऽत्र नयसप्तके नान्तर्यातीति सर्वाभिप्रायसंग्राहका एते इति स्थितम्। ... तथाहि नैगमनयदर्शनानुसारिणौ नैयायिकवैशेषिकौ, संग्रहाभिप्रायप्रवृत्ताः सर्वेऽपि अद्वैतवादाः सांख्यदर्शनं च, व्यवहार-नयानुपातिप्रायश्चार्वाकदर्शनम्, ऋजुसूत्राकूतप्रवृत्तबुद्धयस्ताथागताः, शब्दादिनयमताव-लम्बिनो वैयाकरणादयः॥ ... तथाहि नयति केनचिद् अंशेन विशिष्टमर्थं प्रापयति योऽभिप्रायः स नयः॥ २९॥

इह त्रिविधं श्रुतम्। तद्यथा। मिथ्याश्रुतं, नयश्रुतं, स्याद्वादश्रुतम्। तत्र श्रूयते इति श्रुतमागमः। मिथ्याऽलीकं श्रुतं मिथ्याश्रुतम्। तच्च दुर्नयाभिप्रायप्रवृत्तं तीर्थिकसम्बन्धि निर्गोचरत्वात्। तथा नयैः हेतुभूतैः श्रुतं नयश्रुतम्। एतच्च अर्हदागमान्तर्गतमेव एकनयाभिप्रायप्रतिबद्धम्। ... तथा निर्दिश्यमानधर्मव्यतिरिक्ताशेषधर्मान्तरसंसूचकेन स्यात् युक्तो वादोऽभिप्रेतधर्मवचनं स्याद्वादः। तदात्मकं श्रुतं तत् किंभूतमुच्यते इत्यत्राह। संपूर्णो विकलः स चासावर्थश्च तद्विनिश्चायि तन्निर्णयहेतुत्वाद् एवमभिधीयते। ... नयानां नैगमादीनाम् एकनिष्ठानां एकधर्मग्रहणपर्य्यवसितानां श्रुतवर्त्मनि आगम-

मार्गे प्रवृत्तेः प्रवर्त्तनान्न तदेकैकाभिप्रायप्रतिबद्धं संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि तत्समुदायस्यैव संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायकत्वाद् इत्याकूतम् ॥ ३० ॥

स्वान्यौ आत्मपरौ निर्भासयितुम् उद्द्योतयितुं शीलमस्येति स्वान्यनिर्भासी स्वस्वरूपार्थयोः प्रकाशक इति यावत् । ... विवर्त्तनम् अपरापरपर्य्यायेषु गमनं विवृत्तिः परिणामः सा विद्यते यस्येति विवृत्तिमान् । स्व आत्मा संवेद्यते अनेनेति स्वसंवेदनं तेन सम्यक् सिद्धः प्रतिष्ठितः प्रतीतो वा स्वसंवेदनसंसिद्धः । क्षितिः पृथिवी आदिर्येषां तानि क्षित्यादीनि । आदिशब्दाद् अम्बुतेजोवाय्वाकाशानि गृह्यन्ते । न विद्यते आत्मा स्वरूपमस्येति अनात्मकः ... क्षित्यादिस्वरूपो न भवति इत्यर्थः । ... स्वान्यनिर्भासीत्यनेन प्रागुक्तस्वपराभासिप्रमाणविशेषवन्मीमांसकान् परोक्षबुद्धिवादिनो योगाचारांश्च ज्ञानमात्रवादिनः प्रतिक्षिपति । कथं ज्ञानज्ञानिनोः कथंचिदभेदेन तदुक्तन्यायाविशेषादिति कर्त्ता भोक्तेति विशेषणद्वयेन सांख्यमतं विकुट्टयति । विवृत्तिमानित्यमुना तु एकान्तनित्यं अपरिणामिनं नैयायिकवैशेषिकादिप्रकल्पितं प्रमातारं निरस्यति सर्वथाऽविचलितरूपस्य अर्थग्रहणपरिणामानुपपत्तेः ॥ ३१ ॥

प्रमाणानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि आदिशब्दान्नयपरिग्रहः । तेषां व्यवस्था प्रतिनियतलक्षणादिरूपा मर्य्यादा सा इयमनन्तरोक्तस्थित्या प्रकीर्त्तितेति । ... सर्वसंव्यवहर्त्तॄणां लौकिकतीर्थिकभेदभिन्नसमस्तव्यवहारवतां प्रसिद्धाऽपि रूढाऽपि तदप्रसिद्धौ निखिलव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसंगात् । ... प्रकीर्त्तिता संशब्दिता अव्युत्पन्नविप्रतिपन्नव्यामोहापोहायेति गम्यते ॥ ३२ ॥

स्याद्वादकेसरिसुभीषणनादभीते
त्रस्तस्वलोलनयनान् प्रपलाय्यमानान् ।
हे दुर्नयाश्रितकुतीर्थिमृगाननन्य-
त्राणान् विहाय जिनमेत्य तमाश्रयध्वम् ॥

भक्तिर्मया भगवति प्रकटीकृतेयं
तच्छासनांशकथनान्न मतिः स्वकीया ।
मोहादतो यदिह किंचिदभूदसाधु
तत् साधवः कृतकृपा मयि शोधयन्तु ॥

न्यायावतारविवृतिं विधिना विधित्सोः
सिद्धः पुन र्य इह पुण्यचयस्ततो मे ।
नित्यः परार्थकरणोद्यतमाभवान्तात्
भूयाज्जिनेन्द्रमतलम्पटमेव चेतः ॥

इति न्यायावतारविवृतिः समाप्ता । कृतिरियं सितपट्ट श्रीसिद्धसेनदिवाकरव्याख्यानकस्य तर्कप्रकरणवृत्तेरिति ॥

## TRANSLATION WITH NOTES.

1. *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the knowledge which illumines itself and other things without any obstruction : it is divided as *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge or perception) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) as knowables are ascertained in two ways.

This definition sets aside the view of those Buddhists [Yogācāras] who maintain that knowledge illumines itself alone, inasmuch as there is, according to them, no external object beyond it. The same definition is also in direct opposition to the doctrine of the Naiyāyika, Mīmāṁsaka and others who hold that knowledge illumines external objects alone, as it cannot illumine itself. The Jainas maintain that it is only when knowledge illumines itself that it can take cognizance of external objects. So according to them knowledge, like a lamp, illumines itself as well as objects lying outside it.

Those whose sight has been obscured by darkness often see many false images, such as two moons, etc. ; and men bewildered by sophism are found to believe that every thing is momentary or the like. With a view to differentiate such kinds of false knowledge from *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) the phrase " without obstruction " has been used.

*Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is divided here into *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) including in the latter *anumāna* (inference) and *śabda* (verbal testimony). This division contravenes the conclusion of Cārvāka that there is only one *pramāṇa*, viz., *pratyakṣa* (perception or direct knowledge). Cārvāka's view is unreasonable, for *pratyakṣa* cannot be established as a *pramāṇa* except through the medium of *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). It also sets aside the view of the Saugatas (Buddhists) who divide *pramāṇa* into *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge or perception) and *anumāna* (inference) without any notice of *śabda* (verbal testimony).

2. *Pramāṇas* and the practical use made of them are well known : there appears no necessity for giving any definition of *pramāṇa*.

There was never a time when the acts of seeing, inferring, etc., were not performed. The use of these acts is also well known, for it is through them that we can choose one thing and reject another thing. So it appears superfluous to explain the nature of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge).

3. The necessity here for giving the definition of the well-known *pramāṇas* is to remove stupidity from the mind of stupid people.

*Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), though well known, is explained here to warn foolish people against taking false knowledge as true.

4. Such knowledge that takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge or perception) ; the other is known as *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance.

The words *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for sense-perception, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jaina scriptures, however, *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of the senses, while *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and verbal testimony.

5. Knowledge determinant of that which is to be proved (*i.e.*, the major term called in Sanskrit *sādhya*), derived through the mark (*i.e.*, the middle term called in Sanskrit *liṅga*) which is inseparably connected with the same, is known as *anumāna* (inference) : being a *pramāṇa* it is free from invalidity like perception (*pratyakṣa*).

Inference is of two kinds : (1) *svārthānumāna*, inference for one's own self, and (2) *parārthānumāna*, inference for the sake of others. The first kind is the inference

drawn in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. Suppose that having repeatedly seen in the kitchen and other places, that where there is smoke there is fire, and having realised in his mind that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke, a man afterwards goes to a hill and entertains a doubt as to whether or not there is fire in it. Instantly, when he observes smoke on it, he recollects the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes in his mind that the hill has fire in it, as it has smoke on it. This is an inference for one's own self. Inference for the sake of others will be defined later on.

This definition of inference, says the commentator, sets aside the view of certain writers [such as Dharmakīrti the Buddhist] who maintain that non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), identity (*svabhāva*) and causality (*kārya*) are the marks or grounds of inference, or of certain other writers who hold the effect (*kārya*), cause (*kāraṇa*), conjunction (*saṁyoga*), co-existence (*samavāya*), and opposition (*virodha*) to be such marks or grounds. The division of inference as (1) à priori (*purvavat*, from cause to effect), (2) à posteriori (*śeṣavat*, from effect to cause), and (3) from analogy (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*, perception of homogeneousness, that is, the recognition of the subject as being referrable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be predicable of the class) [as given in the Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda Gautama] is also hereby set aside.

6. Since it is a *pramāṇa*, *pratyakṣa* (perception), too, is not invalid, for "a *pramāṇa* is invalid" is an absurd expression.

Some [Buddhists] who maintain that the world is true only from the practical or illusory point of view (*lokasaṁvṛti*), but false from the transcendental or absolute standpoint (*pāramārthika*), consider perception (*pratyakṣa*) to be merely illusory and consequently invalid from the absolute standard of truth. But this view is opposed by the Jainas who maintain that the world is real from all standpoints and consequently perception is not invalid.

7. Owing to the impossibility of all phenomena (external objects) being invalid, *pramāṇa* is evidently a determinant of self and other things and serves to establish both.

The world is not an illusion : knowledge and its objects are all real.

8. Knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception, is known as *śābda* (verbal testimony).

*Śābda* (the word or verbal testimony) is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) *laukika* (knowledge derived from a reliable person), and (2) *śāstraja* (knowledge derived from scripture).

9. Scripture (*śāstra*) is that which was first known by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instructions and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.

This definition sets aside the view of those [Mīmāṁsakas] who maintain that scripture [such as the Veda] is eternal and was not composed by any human being. Scripture could not have been called a verbal testimony (*śābda* or word), unless it embodied the words of any particular person or persons.

10. Like the decision for oneself, the production of a decision in others is called by the learned 'knowledge for the sake of others' (*parārtha-māna*) : speech is designated as such by metaphor.

Knowledge is of two kinds : (1) knowledge for one's own self (*svārtha māna*), and (2) knowledge for the sake of others (*parārtha māna*). The second is defined as that which produces decision or belief (*niścaya*) in others, *i.e.*, which enables others to ascertain the nature of things. The "word" or "speech" (*śabda* or *vākya*) comes under this class, that is, it is knowledge for the sake of others, for it produces decision in others. It is true the "word" itself is not knowledge, but being the medium through which knowledge is conveyed to others, it is figuratively identified with knowledge.

11. Perception and inference having disclosed objects with which we are familiar and they being the means of communication to other people, both of them are knowledge for the sake of others.

Perception and inference are as much knowledge for one's own self (*svārtha māna*) as for the sake of others (*parārtha māna*). They are called "knowledge for the sake of others" because the results of perception and inference arrived at by one's own self can be communicated to others through words.

12. A statement expressive of the object ascertained by perception is also called perception: it is so called being the cause of the object's manifestation.

As the result of perception can be communicated to others through word, the word itself is figuratively called perception. For instance, the deposition of a witness is taken by the judge as equivalent to perception, though in truth the judge has not perceived the fact deposed to.

13. A statement expressive of the reason (*i.e.*, mark or the middle term called *hetu*) which is inseparably connected with that which is to be proved (*i.e.*, the major term called *sādhya*) having been composed of the minor term (called *pakṣa* signifying a side or place), etc., is called an inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*).

In an "inference for the sake of others" the minor term (*pakṣa*), etc., must be explicitly set forth. The major term (*sādhya*) is that which is to be proved. The middle term or reason (*hetu*, *liṅga* or *sādhana*) is that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term (*sādhya* or *liṅgi*). The minor term, locus or abode (*pakṣa*), is that with which the reason or middle term (*hetu*) is connected, and whose connection with the major term (*sādhya*) is to be proved. In a proposition the subject is the minor term (*pakṣa*), and the predicate the major term (*sādhya*). The following is an "inference for the sake of others":—

(1) This *hill* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term)—proposition (*pratijñā*);
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term);
(3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, *e.g.*, a *kitchen* (example, *dṛṣṭānta*);
(4) *so* is this hill full of smoke (application, *upanaya*);
(5) *therefore* this hill is full of fire (conclusion, *nigamana*).

The above is a mediocre (*madhyama*) form of an "inference for the sake of others." Here the minor term (*pakṣa*), the major term (*sādhya*), the middle term (*hetu*) and example (*dṛṣṭānta*) have been used. The worst (*jaghanya*) form of an "inference for the sake of others" consists in a mere statement of the reason or middle term (*hetu*) in addition to the major term (*sādhya*) and the minor term (*pakṣa*), thus:—

(1) This *hill* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term);
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

The best (*uttama*) form of an inference for the sake of others consists in the statement of the following ten parts or members (*daśāvayava*): (1) proposition (*pratijñā*); (2) correction of the proposition (*pratijñā-śuddhi*); (3) reason or middle term (*hetu*); (4) correction of the reason or middle term (*hetu-śuddhi*); (5) example (*dṛṣṭānta*); (6) correction of the example (*dṛṣṭānta-śuddhi*); (7) application (*upanaya*); (8) correction of the application (*upanaya-śuddhi*); (9) conclusion (*nigamana*) and (10) correction of the conclusion (*nigamana-śuddhi*).

Any form containing less than ten members down to five is called mediocre (*madhyama*).

14. *Pakṣa* (the minor term) is that which is asserted to be connected with the (major term or) *sādhya* and is not excluded by perception, etc.: it is to be used here (in an inference for the sake of others) as exhibiting a locus or abode of the reason (*i.e.*, the middle term called *hetu*).

Some philosophers hold that the minor term (*pakṣa*) is not an essential part of an inference. But this view, according to the Jainas, is untenable, it being absolutely necessary to state the minor term (*pakṣa*) in an inference.

15. Otherwise owing to a misconception as to the locus or abode of the reason (*i.e.*, *pakṣa* or minor term) as intended by the disputant, his reason (*hetu* or middle term) may appear to his opponent as absurd.

If any disputant does not explicitly state the minor term (*pakṣa*), his reason might be misunderstood by his opponent, *e.g.* :—

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term)
(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term).

The above inference, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form :—

(1) Full of fire (major term) :
(2) because full of smoke (middle term).

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any locus or abode (minor term, *pakṣa*) in which the fire and smoke abide in union, and might mistake a lake for such a locus or abode. In such a case the whole argument will be misunderstood.

16. A man who has come to behold the excellence of an archer will have to behold the opposite of it, if the archer hits without fixing an aim.

Just as a clever archer, with a view to preventing his arrow from going to a wrong direction, fixes his aim before hitting, so a skilful disputant in order to avoid being misunderstood, should in stating an inference mention the minor term (*pakṣa*) with which the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*hetu*) are both connected.

17. The reason (or the middle term *i.e.*, *hetu*) may be used to show connection or the opposite of it : in either of these two ways the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) can be proved.

The reason or middle term (*hetu*) can be used in two ways as follows : (1) the reason or middle term (*hetu*) may exist only if the major term (*sādhya*) existed, such as in the proposition "here there is fire because there is smoke," the smoke (middle term) may exist only if there is fire (major term) ; and (2) the reason or middle term (*hetu*) cannot exist if the major term (*sādhya*) does not exist, such as in the proposition "here there is fire because otherwise there could not be any smoke" the smoke (middle term) could not have existed if there had been no fire (major term).

18. Where the inseparable connection of the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*sādhana* or *hetu*) is ascertained by homogeneousness (*sādharmya*), the example is called a homogeneous one on account of the connection (between those terms) being recollected.

An example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is a familiar case which assures the inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) between the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*hetu*). It is of two kinds : (1) homogeneous (*sādharmyavat*), and (2) heterogeneous (*vaidharmyavat*). The homogeneous example is that which assures the connection (*vyāpti*) by homogeneousness (*sādharmya*) thus :—

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term) ;
(3) as a *kitchen* (homogeneous example).

Here the fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen.

19. The heterogeneous example is that which shows that the absence of the major term (*sādhya*) is followed by the absence of the middle term (*sādhana*).

The heterogeneous example assures the connection (*vyāpti*) by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term (*sādhya*) is attended by the absence of the middle term (*hetu*), thus :—

(1) This hill has no *smoke* (major term) ;
(2) because it has no *fire* (middle term) ;
(3) as a *lake* (heterogeneous example).

20. Logicians maintain that to cite an example from outside is useless as that which is to be proved (*sādhya*) can be proved through internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*) even without such example.

Internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*) occurs when the minor term (*pakṣa*) itself as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) shows the inseparable connection between them, thus :—

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term) which is their common abode.

External inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) occurs when an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) from outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) to assure the inseparable connection between them thus :—

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term) ;
(3) as a *kitchen* (example).

Here the kitchen, which forms no essential part of the inference, is introduced from outside as the common abode of fire and smoke to assure the inseparable connection between them (the fire and smoke).

Some logicians [such as Vasubandhu] hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*), can be established by the internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*) alone, so the pointing out of the external inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) is superfluous. Other logicians go so far as to say that even if the minor term (*pakṣa*) is not used, there will be no impossibility in establishing the major term (*sādhya*). Cf.

(1) This *hill* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term) ;
(3) as a *kitchen* (example).

In the above example " as a kitchen," that is, the example, is, according to these logicians, superfluous. Even the minor term (*pakṣa*) can, according to them, be dispensed with thus :—

(1) Full of *fire* (major term) ;
(2) because full of *smoke* (middle term).

Even here, where there is no minor term (*pakṣa*), the example (*dṛṣṭānta*), according to them, is useless.

21. If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed is opposed by evidence (*liṅga*), the public understanding, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis (*Pakṣābhāsa*) of which there are many varieties.

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term or thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) arises when one predicates of the minor term (*pakṣa*) that which is yet to be proved to the opponent, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public understanding or incongruous with one's own statement, thus :—

(1) " The jar is animate (*paudgalika*)"—this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.
(2) " Every thing is momentary "—this is a Saugata (Buddhist) doctrine which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.
(3) " The general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone "—this is opposed to perception.
(4) " There is no omniscient being "—this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.
(5) " The sister is to be taken as wife "—this is inconsistent with the public understanding.
(6) " All things are non-existent "—this is incongruous with one's own statement.

22. The reason (*i.e.*, the middle term called *hetu*) has been defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term (*sādhya*) : the fallacy of the reason (*hetvābhāsa*) arises from non-conception, doubt or misconception about it (the middle term).

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term);
(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

In this example "smoke" is the middle term or reason (*hetu*) which cannot exist except in an inseparable connection (union) with "fire" which is the major term (*sādhya*).

23. That which has not yet been established is called "the unproved" (*asiddha*); that which is possible only in the opposite way is called "the contradictory" (*viruddha*); and that which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite way is called "the uncertain" (*anaikāntika*).

Semblance of the reason or fallacy of the middle term (*hetvābhāsa*) is of three kinds as follows :—

(1) The unproved (*asiddha*) such as: "this lotus is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus." Here the reason, *viz.*, the sky-lotus [which is unreal] is unproved.
(2) The contradictory (*viruddha*) such as: "this is fiery because it is a body of water." Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.
(3) The uncertain (*anaikāntika*) such as: "all things are momentary because they are existent." Here the reason alleged is uncertain because 'existence' may or may not be a proof of momentariness, for, an opponent might equally argue: "all things are eternal because they are existent."

24. Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) in the homogeneous form arise here from an imperfect middle term or from a defect in the major term, etc.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) arise from a defect in the major term (*sādhya*) or middle term (*hetu*) or both or from doubt about them, thus :—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term), like *perception* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of true knowledge* (middle term), like a *dream* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (*hetu*), for a dream is not a source of true knowledge.

(3) The omniscient being is not *existent* (major term), because he is not *apprehended by the senses* (middle term), like a *jar* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms ((*sādhya* and *hetu*), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is *devoid of passions* (major term), because he is *mortal* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(5) This person is *mortal* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(6) This person is not *omniscient* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and not omniscient.

Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz. :—

(1) Unconnected (*ananvaya*), such as: This person is *full of passions* (major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term), like a *certain man in Magadha* (example).

Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between " being a speaker " and " being full of passions."

(2) Of connection unshown (*apradarśitānvaya*), such as :—
Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is a product (middle term), as a jar (example).

Here though there is an inseparable connection between " product " and " non-eternal " yet it has not been shown in the proper form, as :—

" Whatever is a product is non-eternal as a jar."

[Dignāga the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the example into a universal proposition with a view to showing the connection between the middle term and the major term in the proper form.]

(3) Of contrary connection (*viparītānvaya*), such as :—
Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is a product (middle term).

Here if the inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) is shown thus—

" Whatever is non-eternal is a product as a jar," instead of thus—
" Whatever is a product is non-eternal as a jar, " the example would involve the fallacy of contrary connection.

25. Logicians have declared that fallacies of example in the heterogeneous form arise when the absence of the major term (*sādhya*) or the middle term (*sādhana* or *hetu*) or both is not shown or when there is a doubt about them.

The fallacy of heterogeneous example (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) is of six kinds, thus :—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of true knowledge* (middle term) ; whatever is not invalid is not a source of true knowledge as a *dream* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for a dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid.

(2) Perception is *non-reflective* or *nirvikalpaka* (major term), because it is a *source of true knowledge* (middle term) ; whatever is reflective or *savikalpaka* is not a source of true knowledge, as *inference* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (*sādhana*), for inference is really a source of true knowledge though it has been cited as not such.

(3) Sound is *eternal* and *non-eternal* (major term), because it is an *existence* (middle term) ; whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a *jar* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for the jar is both " eternal and non-eternal," and " an existence."

(4) Kapila is non-*omniscient* (major term), because he is a non-*propounder of the four noble truths* (middle term) ; whoever is not non-omniscient is not non-propounder of the four noble truths, as *Buddha* (the heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the negative form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (*sādhya*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.

(5) This person is *untrustworthy* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term) ; whoever is not untrustworthy is not full of passions, a *Buddha* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (*hetu*), for it is doubftul whether Buddha is not full of passions.

(6) Kapila is not devoid of *passions* (major term), because he did *not give his own flesh to the hungry* (middle term) ; whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as *Buddha* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry.

Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz. :—

(1) Unseparated (*avyatireki*) : This person is not *devoid of passions* (major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term) ; whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a *piece of stone* (heterogeneous example).

Here though a piece of stone is both " devoid of passions " and " not a speaker," yet there is no unavoidable separation (*vyatireka-vyāpti*) between " devoid of passions " and " a speaker."

(2) Of separation unshown (*apradarśita-vyatireka*) :
Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is a product (middle term) ; as *ether* (example).

Here though there is an unavoidable separation between " product " and " eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as : " Whatever is eternal is not a product, as ether."

[Dignāga the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the heterogeneous example into a universal negative proposition with a view to pointing out the connection of the middle term and the major term].

(3) Of contrary separation (*viparīta-vyatireka*) :
Sound is not *eternal* (major term), because it is a product (middle term) ; whatever is not a product is eternal, as *ether* (example).

Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been : " Whatever is eternal is not a product, as *ether*."

26. Refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) is the pointing out of the aforesaid fallacies in the reasoning of an opponent ; but it is called a semblance of a refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*) when the reasoning is really devoid of defects.

A disputant is said really to refute his opponent, if the former can detect in the reasoning of the latter any of the fallacies aforementioned. But it will be a mere semblance of refutation if he ascribes to his opponent fallacies which he has not really committed.

27. That which is characterised as free from all obstructions and shines as the absolute is called (supreme or transcendental) perception ; it uninterruptedly illumines the nature of all objects.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is used in two senses : (1) supreme or transcendental (*pāramārthika*), and (2) practical (*vyāvahārika*). The practical perception consists of knowledge acquired by the soul through the channels of the senses such as the visual knowledge, auditory knowledge, etc. The transcendental perception is knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation without the intervention of the senses or signs.

28. The immediate effect of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance ; and the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is bliss and equanimity while that of the ordinary practical knowledge is the facility to select or reject.

*Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is of two kinds : (1) *kevala*, absolute and (2) *a-kevala*, ordinary. The immediate effect of both is the cessation of ignorance. The mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is happiness and equanimity, while that of the ordinary knowledge is the facility which it affords us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable.

29. Since things have many characters (that is, may be conceived from many points of view), they are the objects of all-sided knowledge (omniscience) ; but a thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of *naya* (or one-sided knowledge).

Objects, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, possess many different characteristics and may be taken from different standpoints. They are understood in their entire

character by omniscience alone, while to take them from one particular standpoint is the scope of *naya* (the one-sided method of comprehension).

*Naya* (the one-sided method of comprehension) is of seven kinds mentioned below :—

(1) *Naigama* (the non-distinguished) is the method by which an object is taken in its generic and specific capacities not distinguished from each other. For instance, by the term " bamboo " one may understand a number of properties, some of which are peculiar to its own species, while the remaining ones are possessed by it in common with other trees such as a mango, jack, banyan, etc., without any distinction being made between these two classes of properties. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy follow the *Naigama naya*.

(2) *Saṁgraha* (the generic) is the method by which the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular properties which, independent of the former, are non-entities, like sky-flowers. Thus, when we speak of a mango, jack or bamboo, we mean that it is a tree. The Advaita and Sāṁkhya systems of philosophy follow the *Saṁgraha naya*.

(3) *Vyavahāra* (the practical) is the method by which the practical or particular alone is considered, for the general without the particular is a non-entity like the horn of a hare. On being asked to bring a tree, can anybody bring the tree in general ? No, he can bring only a particular tree such as a mango, jack or bamboo.

The Cārvāka philosophy follows the *Vyavahāra naya*.

(4) *Ṛju-sūtra* (the straight expression) is the method by which a thing, as it exists at present, is considered without any reference to the past or future. It is useless to ponder over things as they were in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes are served by the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man, who was formerly (in a previous birth) my son, is now born as a prince somewhere else ; he is of no practical use to me now. So the *Ṛju-sutra* recognises only the entity itself (*bhāva*) and does not consider the name (*nāma*), image (*sthāpanā*) or the constituent cause (*dravya*). For instance, a poor cowherd, if he bears the *name of Indra*, does not thereby become the lord of heavens. An *image* of a king cannot accomplish the function of the king himself. The *causes* in me which will lead to my accepting a different kind of body in a future birth cannot enable me to enjoy that body now. Some hold that the atoms alone are true, and aggregates or lumps of them constitute things. This doctrine is followed by the Buddhists.

(5) *Śabda* (the verbal) consists in using a word in a conventional sense and not according to its etymological derivation. Thus the word *śatru* usually, or in its conventional sense, means " enemy," while etymologically " a destroyer." The grammarians are the followers of this method.

(6) *Samabhirūḍha* (the subtle) consists in making nice distinctions among the synonyms, applying each name appropriately according to their etymological derivation. The grammarians are the followers of this method.

(7) *Evambhūta* (the such-like) consists in naming a thing only when it possesses its practical efficiency. Thus a man should be named *śakra*, if he actually possesses strength (*śakti*) implied by the name. The grammarians are the followers of this method.

30. Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided *nayas*, is called *Syādvāda-śruta*.

The *śruta* or scriptural knowledge is of three kinds, *viz.* : (1) false hearing or knowledge (*mithyā-śruta*), such as that derived from the scripture of the bad Tīrthikas ; (2) hearing of the one-sided method (*naya-śruta*), that is, knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from any particular standpoint ; and (3) hearing of the all-sided method (*syād-vāda-śruta*), that is, knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from all-sided standpoints. The *naya-śruta* (knowledge of the one-sided method) has been described in the previous verse. The *syād-vāda* (knowledge of the all-sided method) is described below :—

*Syād-vāda*, which literally signifies assertion of possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all possible standpoints. Things are neither existent

nor non-existent absolutely. A thing may be said to exist in a certain way and to be non-existent in another way, and so forth. *Syād-vāda* examines things from seven points of view, hence the doctrine is also called *sapta-bhaṅgī-naya* (seven-fold paralogism). It is stated as follows: (1) May be, it is (*syād-asti*); (2) may be, it is not (*syād-nāsti*); (3) may be, it is and it is not (*syād-asti-nāsti*); (4) may be, it is indescribable (*syād-avyaktavyam*); (5) may be, it is and yet indescribable (*syād-asti ca avaktavyañca*); (6) may be, it is not and also indescribable (*syād nāsti ca avaktavyañca*); (7) may be it is and it is not and also indescribable (*syādasti ca nāsti ca avaktavyañca*).

When a thing is to be established we say "it is," when it is to be denied, we say "it is not." When a thing is to be established and denied in turn, we say "it is and it is not." When a thing is to be established and denied simultaneously, we say "it is indescribable." When a thing is to be established and yet to be described as indescribable, we say "it is and yet indescribable." When a thing is to be denied and also declared as indescribable, we say "it is not and also indescribable." When a thing is to be established and denied as well as declared indescribable at the same time, we say "it is and it is not, and also indescribable." *Syād* which signifies "may be" denotes all these seven possibilities, that is, a thing may be looked upon from one of the above seven points of view, there having been no eighth alternative.

31. The spirit (soul or *jīva*) is the knower, doer and enjoyer, illumines itself and others, undergoes changes of condition, is realised only in self-consciousness and is different from the earth, etc.

The soul (*ātman* or *jīva*) *has* knowledge and so is different from knowledge itself. As an enjoyer and doer the soul of the Jaina philosophy is different from that of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The soul of the Jainas is described as undergoing changes of condition. In this respect it is different from that of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

32. This system of *pramāṇa*, etc., is beginningless and endless; and though familiar to all persons in every day practice it is yet explained here.

This shows that the world as conceived by the Jainas is eternal.

# INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.

## अ

## INDEX OF WORDS IN ENGLISH.